Allison W. Good

1. “Winning the future?”  Seriously Obama?  That’s the sound byte that made it onto all of today’s front pages.  Who wrote that speech?  Because “winning the future” reads painfully.  It leaves a bad taste in my mouth, because…

2.  As I was discussing with Sarah last night, “winning the future” means winning at the expense of other countries in the developed and developing worlds.  “We need to out-innovate, out-educate, and out-build the rest of the world.”  It was great for a while that India transformed into a technological mecca, and education in China and South Korea is cool and all, but now that they’re actually getting ahead of us in education and technology, it’s biting us in the ass and we have to keep them at bay, because God forbid our status of superpower ever be seriously threatened from abroad.

3.  “We saw that same desire to be free in Tunisia, where the will of the people proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator. And tonight, let us be clear: the United States of America stands with the people of Tunisia, and supports the democratic aspirations of all people.”  This was nice, I’m glad he at least said something about Tunisia, but what about some specifics on Egypt, where the pseudo-republic government is facing widespread protests and violence?  Whatever happens in Egypt is going to heavily influence the direction of this Arab “revolution.”  Also in terms of Egypt, Obama did not say anything related to his 2009 Cairo speech.  He said that “No single wall separates East and West,” but I wanted more about U.S.-Arab relations and the Middle East.  And that’s not just a selfish request, because the President’s foreign affairs campaign platform was rooted in better relations with Arab countries.

4.  It wasn’t inspirational.  I, along with everyone else, was hoping for a Tucson-esque tone that would reinvigorate those he has perhaps alienated since assuming office.  It is the State of the Union, it had to be broad and somewhat vague, but in the end it was dull.  It’s a shame how disenchanted I’ve become with Obama.

5.  NO MENTION OF THE OIL SPILL.  NONE.  For all that talk about clean energy, nothing about the worst ecological disaster in the history of the United States.

6.  The FLOTUS’s dress was ugly and ill-fitting.

7.  Oh, so now the U.S. is getting a light rail system in a few decades?  You know this country is really behind on infrastructure when Jerusalem finally opened its own light rail system late last year after years of construction and setbacks, and the U.S. has yet to even conceptualize one.  And whatever trains we get here in America, they’re never going to be as cool as the European ones.

Things I did like: the guy who saved the Chilean Miners; the camera pan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at “And, yes, we know that some of them are gay. Starting this year, no American will be forbidden from serving the country they love because of who they love;” the salmon joke; and Obama’s dye job.

In a land where history tends to repeats itself, it should come as no surprise that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s second term is echoing his first. January 15 usually passes without much commotion, but this year the anniversary of the signing of the Hebron Protocol is particularly significant because it illuminates a pattern reinforced by the recent setback in American efforts to restart peace talks. Unfortunately, these parallel cases reveal a leader who refuses to implement his written and vocal commitments.

This is not to say that the transfer of civil and security responsibilities as stated in the Protocol was not implemented. Hebron was divided, and Israel redeployed from H-1. It is also true that PLO chairman Yasser Arafat did not keep up his end of the bargain, since he failed to crack down on the terrorist infrastructure and punish those who committed acts of terror and was loathe to revise the Palestinian National Charter’s anti-Israel articles. However, these facts cannot account entirely for Netanyahu’s failure.

Enter Shuhada Street, one of the main thoroughfares in Hebron that runs right through its heavily populated center. The Israeli government had closed the street to Palestinian traffic in 1994 following Baruch Goldstein’s killing rampage at Hebron’s Ibrahimi mosque, and the Palestinian economic hub became a squatting destination for Jewish settlers. In the Hebron Protocol, Israel promised that Shuhada and the adjoining Hasbahe market would be completely reopened to Palestinian traffic within four months of the signing, and the United States would finance its renovation.

Though Shuhada Street opened to Palestinian emergency and municipal vehicles in February, the controversy ignited violent protests by Jewish settlers, and Palestinians responded with force. Six months after the IDF’s redeployment from Hebron, the tension had escalated to the point that Shin Bet chief Ami Ayalon announced Shuhada could not reopen. When Hebron resident Rabbi Shlomo was murdered in his home in August, the situation deteriorated. The street was closed to all Palestinian vehicles, and the IDF imposed a curfew. Netanyahu had desperately wanted to show the public that he supported the Oslo peace process, but in the end he never delivered.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu had to compensate his right-wing constituency after giving concessions in the Protocol.  He announced that plans to build in Har Homa, an area between Bethlehem and Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhoods, would go forward. This created new facts on the ground, and when the Clinton administration tried to persuade the Prime Minister to postpone, Netanyahu balked. Regardless of whether his decision was a product of government pressure or of personal convictions, it was his decision to make.

When the Prime Minister was elected for the second time in 2009, it appeared he was a changed man. The Prime Minister was ready to get down to business, and he publicly acknowledged the need for a two-state solution.  Later that year, he announced a 10-month settlement building moratorium in a bid to restart peace talks. Perhaps Netanyahu would not be the solid Likud leader he had been the first time around. Perhaps he was prepared to face off with his coalition if a final settlement with the Palestinian Authority was in sight.

In March 2010 Netanyahu and PA President Mahmoud Abbas agreed to resume proximity talks under the auspices of the United States, unfreezing the peace process after months of stagnation. Shortly after the announcement was made, Vice President Joe Biden visited Israel to triumphantly restart negotiations, only to be upstaged by the Interior Ministry’s simultaneous approval of a building project in Ramat Shlomo, a neighborhood in northern Jerusalem over the Green Line. The US spent the ensuing months trying to broker an extension on the construction freeze before it expired September in order to prevent a setback. No deal was made in time for the deadline, and the peace process was again at an impasse. The American team continued to poke and prod Netanyahu, but not even a $3-billion package of fighter jets security incentives could persuade him.

For the second time, the Prime Minister botched a peace initiative mediated by the US. In both 1997 and 2009 he undertook measures that pegged him as a possible peacemaker, but each was followed with a promise to continue the construction of settlements and an unraveling of the peace process. Netanyahu has rightfully earned the title of “serial bungler,” bestowed by the The Economist in October 1997.

As for the Hebron Protocol, Shuhada Street has yet to be reopened. It was closed to Palestinians during the Second Intifada, and the IDF ordered its storefronts closed and imposed months-long curfews. These days it remains a ghost town, but it is painfully obvious that Netanyahu does not intend to fix past mistakes. At present there is no indication that he intends to rethink his recent ones either. Until Prime Minister Netanyahu is truly ready to take the peace process by the horns, the Israelis and Palestinians will continue to be subjected to more of the same.

Freedom is not free.  In a country like Israel, where national security is the primary concern, and where military service is (almost) mandatory, the catch is that the IDF ultimately rules the roost.  The supremacy of the IDF regarding the structure of Israel’s government is not always visible to the naked and untrained eye, but a recent avalanche of events states the obvious: Israel is democratic both in name and in practice to a degree, but the fact is that unregulated freedom of expression cannot coexist with a pervasive, rigorously secretive, and heavily criticized military institution.

The IDF has taken things up a notch lately.  Last week there was the incident in Bil’in at an anti-separation fence protest, when a Palestinian woman was brought to the hospital after inhaling tear gas.  On Friday, the IDF’s commander in the West Bank, Brig. Gen. Nitzan Alon, said “‘She most probably died as a result of other complications, combined with problems in the medical care she received at the Palestinian hospital.’”

The Geneva Conventions prohibit the use of tear gas in warfare, but that does not mean states cannot use it domestically as a means for controlling riots.  And yet, what happened at Bil’in could hardly be called a riot.  There was no visible indication that the protest would become violent, but tear gas was dispersed as the protesters reached the fence.

A second incident that comes to mind, of course, is Friday’s IDF raid on a Hamas cell in Hebron.  Five members of Hamas who had been released by the Palestinian Authority on Thursday were re-arrested, but a 65-year-old male Palestinian civilian was killed in the process.  All the IDF said about it was that “the man was ‘present in one of the terrorist’s homes.’”  The victim was shot, unarmed, in his bedroom.

Publicly, the IDF has only gone so far as to regret this “accident” and promise an investigation.  Israeli papers seem to be ignoring the reports that one of the Hamas men was the victim’s nephew, and that the shooting was simply a case of “mistaken identity.”

None of this, particularly in the context of last year’s Anat Kam-Uri Blau affair, makes the IDF look good.  National security is important, but the international community has and will continue to respond with a barrage of criticism.  Any negative exposure or criticism of IDF activities is viewed legally as a threat to national security, and I am sure there are many secrets out there that would jeopardize the safety of Israel’s citizens.

This is the reason for a recent campaign against “delegitimizers.”  On Wednesday the Knesset plenum voted to “establish a parliamentary panel of inquiry into left-wing Israeli organizations that allegedly participate in delegitimization campaigns against Israel Defense Forces soldiers,” with 47 in favor and 16 against.  The initiative, which came from Yisrael Beiteinu, “called primarily to investigate the sources of funding for these groups” and determine “whether this money is coming from foreign states or even organizations deemed to be involved in terrorist activities.”

Yisrael Beiteinu released a statement that reads like it originated in an authoritarian environment.  The tone is paranoid and evasive:

“these organizations…have even been wandering for years in Israeli schools and tell the youth to evade military service.”

“These organizations do not really care about the state of human rights, a fact evidenced by the fact that they have never worked for the rights of women in Arab society, nor discussed the status of democracy in Saudi Arabia”

Whether or not the “delegitimizers” really are treasonous infiltrators, this probe does not bode well for freedom of expression as it exists in Israel.  But is the establishment of this panel really surprising?  National security and unbridled freedom of expression are not complementary concepts, which is why there are limits on what we can publish and publicly advocate for and against.  This is the very essence of the social contract that Israelis enter into by choosing to remain a citizen of the state.

In this case, the pendulum has swung too far to the right.  Yisrael Beiteinu is always looking for an excuse to censure the left, and allegations of delegitimizaton is a bandwagon that a wide spectrum of MK’s can jump on.  For them, the choice is between freedom of expression and an Iranian nuclear attack.  If this structural and ideological trend continues and gains speed, Israel may be forced to make some difficult choices.

President Obama and Sec. of State Clinton betted on Barak.  Apparently, according to an anonymous Israeli official, the White House counted on the defense minister because “he said he could nudge Netanyahu toward an agreement with the Palestinians.”  From then on, Barak received “special treatment” from the American administration, and Obama even met with him at the White House.  A US official told the same Israeli official (again, anonymously) that Barak “charmed us with his intelligent analyses; the president listened to Barak like a student with his teacher and trusted him.”

So why the upset?  Barak was the one who negotiated “an understanding with Washington over extending the settlement construction freeze by three months in exchange for a written pledge of diplomatic and military guarantees in September.”  Not surprisingly, he never delivered.  The frustration with Barak apparently “reached as high as Obama and Clinton.”  Clinton overtly snubbed Barak by meeting with him for a short 15 minutes at last month’s Saban Forum.

I’m not quite sure why the US thought Barak could persuade Netanyahu to accept a settlement freeze.  Given recent history, it’s logistically impossible.  This time, I’m sticking it to Obama.  He should have done his homework.

Let’s start with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s first term.  He eventually (and reluctantly) came to enough of an understanding with US Middle East envoy Dennis Ross and gave the concessions necessary for the conclusion of the Hebron Agreement, whose fourteenth anniversary is ironically approaching.  But then he announced he was going forward with building projects in Har Homa to satisfy his right-wing constituency, which most considered to be a deliberate attempt to cut Arabs off from Jerusalem.  Under severe pressure from Likud, no American incentive could persuade Netanyahu to freeze the building process and focus on implementing Hebron.

Next, let’s consider that Barak bungled his relationship with the White House during his stint as prime minister.  In the summer of 2000 he begged the administration for an emergency final status summit to save his coalition and political standing, even after numerous statements from Arafat that his team was not yet ready and would need preliminary meetings.  The Camp David talks had a less than 50 percent chance for success, according to Israeli intelligence, and yet Barak made the situation so much worse.

The right of return for Palestinian refugees was taboo, and Barak’s final offer was that Israel would allow about 10,000 Palestinian refugees to return as an Israeli gesture.  His final proposal on the West Bank essentially divided the territory into two, if not three, separate areas since the areas Barak offered were not geographically next to each other.  As for Jerusalem, Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem was off the negotiating table.   And so it was that Barak’s package was dismally incomplete.  I’m not saying that the Palestinians didn’t make equally absurd demands, but Barak’s “concessions” would have never translated into a final status agreement.

Fast forward to 2010.  History has repeated itself.  Everyone wants to think that Netanyahu will tap into his pragmatic side and go along with the US effort to restart proximity talks, which will hopefully lead to direct negotiations.  This time, perhaps, the Prime Minister will be a true maverick, even if it means angering his right-wing base.

As we all know, no such thing happened.  Netanyahu chose instead to announce construction plans for 1,600 units in Ramat Shlomo during Vice President Biden’s visit to Israel in March.  Months were spent trying to get Netanyahu to agree to a temporary building freeze to get the Palestinians on board for talks, but that fizzled, apparently thanks in part to Barak.

When you put two leaders together, both of whom previously served as prime minister, and both of whom failed to move the peace process forward (the Hebron Agreement has yet to be fully implemented), there is no way that one can persuade the other to take the steps necessary for restoring trust between the Israelis and Palestinians.  Both Barak and Netanyahu have track records of circumventing American efforts throughout the history of the peace process.  Their failures are not hidden in confidential cables.  They are visible in plain sight.

Obama mistakenly thought that two “wrong” people could make a “right” decision.  The White House must learn that it cannot put all of its faith in the old guard, or it will never move forward on peace.