Allison W. Good

So much has changed in Israeli politics in the first decade of the 21st century, right? Well, after tonight’s decision to scrap early elections and go for a Likud-Kadima unity government, you could have fooled me. The issues may be slightly different these days, but most of the dynamics are exactly the same.

Now that Labor is back in its comfortable position as the primary opposition, we’ve got a traditional Likud-Labor dichotomy that has characterized the vast majority of Israel’s political history. I don’t think Mofaz will remain in Kadima for much longer; if he wants a higher profile position like Foreign Minister, he’ll need to either merge his party with Likud or break away from Kadima himself. Also, unity governments are always ill-conceived ideas and never turn out well, so there’s that karma.

It’s true that Bibi has gotten smarter since his unfortunate downfall in 1999, but then again the Knesset has also shifted more to the right. Bibi’s maneuvering this time around was more of a well-oiled machine, but it was still calculated based on fear. Bibi was ousted by Barak in 1999 because he was so concerned about his coalition that he spent most of his time flip-flopping and less time actually getting things done. He gave lip service to the Oslo process many a time, but never kept his word. I’m not saying that Bibi 2012 is Bibi 1999, but rather that Mofaz 2012 is Bibi 1999. Mofaz is so worried about his party that he will do anything to save it and his individual political career. Long overshadowed by Livni, he didn’t win the Kadima primary for nothing. He may have voiced support for the social protest movement and previously declared bombing Iran to be a bad idea, but it’s clear that he has an entirely different endgame.

There’s also the issue of Bibi versus the rest of Likud. In the 1990s he couldn’t make certain concessions as required by the Hebron Agreement and the Wye Memorandum not only because his coalition was too fragile, but also because his own party doubted him. The tension between Bibi and Likud MK Moshe Feiglin during the Likud leadership race in January was undeniably divisive, and Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor recently told Al Jazeera that “Iran never vowed to ‘wipe Israel off the map,’ as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly claimed.” Yesterday, Anglo Likud Central Committee member Gidon Ariel announced that he would run against Bibi for the position of Likud Convention President this Sunday evening. Ariel comes from Maale Adumim, and it’s guaranteed that he and his fellow settler Likudniks are not too happy about Bibi welcoming Mofaz and Kadima with open arms. All of this is likely to continue to cause major tension under the Likud-Kadima unity government. Whether it causes the government to implode a la 1999, on the other hand, is a different issue.

These are just some preliminary thoughts. For more, follow me on Twitter at @awg9988, since I will most likely be tweeting up a storm about all of this.

Leon Wieseltier, literary editor of the The New Republic, has an excellent piece up about what he calls the “lost art” of simultaneously defending and criticizing Israel. Here’s the crux of his argument:

SO ISRAEL MUST be defended and Israel must be criticized. Almost nobody any longer practices the lost art of doing both at the same time, with similar emphasis, out of equally intense convictions, in a single breath. Instead there is the party of security and the party of justice, as if the country, any country, can endure without both. The debate is a stale contest in cursing between gangs, a tiresome exchange of to-be-sure sentences, uttered by people with anxieties about credibility, or worse, with no such anxieties at all.

This is a piece that I’ve been waiting to see for a long time, and I think it describes where I am perfectly. My experience studying abroad in Israel lured me away from the right-center of Israeli politics, and more towards the center-left, but not into “Israel shouldn’t be a Jewish state” territory. As I was discussing last night with my good friend who is a peace and conflict studies masters candidate at American University, either you’re allied with AIPAC or with Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP). Those of us who fall somewhere in between, who are more prone to intellectualism and objectivity than to eager — and usually reckless — passions, are misunderstood. We do not care to constantly rehash and re-dissect the specifics of Resolution 242, but to rather look at the bigger picture and deal with the here and now.

I often think that I must confuse a lot of my Jewish friends and family. I think that the concept of defensible borders is obsolete, but I also believe that it’s not realistic for millions of Palestinian refugees to return to Israel. The current government is destroying Israel one cabinet decision at a time, but the left isn’t exactly well-organized, and I don’t think leftist parties will make much headway in the next elections. This morning I didn’t buy a bag of Bamba at the supermarket, even though a portion of the proceeds go to building a community center in Sderot, because that money runs through the Jewish National Fund, which is notorious for its blatant anti-Palestinian views and policies. I don’t see the conflict through the eyes of AIPAC, SJP, B’tselem, Stand With Us, or even J Street. Instead, I take a Wieseltier-esque approach of practical intellectualism — of objectivity, balance (whatever that means), and genuine curiosity.

So will I celebrate Israel’s Independence Day this year? Of course. Do I believe that Israel should be an independent Jewish state? Absolutely. But I also think that Israel’s policies in the West Bank and East Jerusalem are colonialist, and that the IDF is not as moral an army as public and private hasbara makes it out to be. According to most, this makes me anti-Israel, a sort of political apikoros. And to others, I’m still supporting an apartheid regime that will stop at nothing to cleanse Israel of Palestinians once and for all.

What bothers me more than the fact that what I’m describing is a lost art is the fact that I am made to feel so uncomfortable about where I stand. I have completely refrained from being vocally pro-Israel, pro-two state solution, or pro-Palestinian because I do not want to be known as one or the other. I’m not quite sure where this leaves me, but I will keep practicing this lost art. It’s the only way to be credible.

On Tuesday evening, Dennis Ross gave a lecture about the “challenges ahead” for America and the Middle East at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. I definitely appreciated his approach of not trying to predict the future, but I did find fault with his assessment of Iran and his analysis of the current status of Israel-Palestine and the “peace process” (or whatever we’re calling it now).

First, he went into detail about the Arab Awakening, emphasizing that whoever ultimately comes to power in places like Egypt and Tunisia has to govern their citizens and not rule them as subjects. As for the American role in these events, he said, “The story [and] its authors are in the region, they’re not outside the region. We may have a huge stake in what’s going on here, but we’re not in a position to be shaping it.” I’ve deduced, therefore, that he is against an American intervention in Syria, and is probably also against arming the Free Syrian Army. Unlike a lot of talk I’ve been hearing, though, Ross seems to be confident that the Syrian regime’s days are numbered.

Next, he talked about Iran. His “psychic map” for that topic is that crippling sanctions, plus increasing regional and international isolation, provide a context for negotiation. The balance of power, he says, has shifted against Iran, which is no longer able to coerce its neighbors. Beginning in July, the European Union will boycott Iranian oil, and Saudi Arabia has promised to step up and make sure there’s enough oil on the market. Ross seems to think that crippling sanctions hold great promise because, in the past, Iran has changed its behavior when it thought the price was too high. It is ultimately up to the Supreme Leader whether or not Iran goes forward with its nuclear program and how it uses nuclear power, but I don’t think we can necessarily claim precedent on this one. The longer a conflict lasts, the harder it is to solve, and sanctions usually take a long time to work. Israel will bear with negotiations for only so long.

I was pleased that Ross began his comments on Israel-Palestine with observation that the psychological gaps are more profound than the substantive gaps, and that there is popular support among Israelis and Palestinians for a two-state solution that embraces terms similar to the Clinton Parameters. He accurately continued that each side is convinced that the other will not do what is necessary, and that we’re going to see “more of the same.” Sure, the rest of the region isn’t exactly focused on this issue right now, but it’s not going away. Ross concluded that we must continue to pedal the peace process bicycle, or else things are likely to get worse. Even if the circumstances aren’t ripe, both sides must ask themselves how they can alter the context so that change happens over time.

Ross suggested that Israel find ways to validate Palestinians who believe in nonviolence by showing them through reciprocity that Israeli control in the West Bank is receding. He proposes that Israel stop its incursions into Area A, support a larger Palestinian police force in Area B, and permit more Palestinian economic activity in Area C. Maybe then the context will change.

My fundamental disagreement with this point is that changing the facts on the ground will not affect psychology at this point. Statistics show that longer lasting intractable conflicts are much harder to resolve, and you don’t need to look back very far to see how psychologically intractable this conflict is. Just last week, after all, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Abu Mazen traded barbs over Jerusalem. It doesn’t matter what kinds of baby steps Israel takes; there will always be an insurmountable gap on Jerusalem. As for those opinion polls, it’s all hypothetical and, like he said, neither side believes a two-state solution with Clinton Parameters is really going to happen. The leadership on both sides seems to be satisfied with maintaining the status quo, which makes the prospects for what Ross calls “coordinated unilateralism” untenable. If nothing is working, he says, each side can take parallel steps that would be in their own interest and benefit each side. No concessions, just rational actors making rational choices. Unfortunately, it’s quite clear that Netanyahu and Abu Mazen are irrational actors, at least when it comes to the conflict. Ross did leave us with the caveat that he’s not optimistic, but I wonder if pedaling this bicycle actually does more harm than good.

This morning I had the pleasure of attending a panel discussion featuring Haaretz Washington correspondent Natasha Mozgovaya, JTA Washington bureau chief Ron Kampeas, Al-Hayat Washington correspondent Joyce Karam, and expert Mideast policy wonk David Makovsky. Both Makovsky and Mozgovaya confirmed what I thought all along, that what’s happening right now is just political posturing and an exercise in flamboyant deterrence. Here’s what Makovsky had to say:

I think their [Netanyahu and Barak] fear was that the IAEA report would get lost, and they’re looking for ways to keep this issue in the international news so that it gets maximum attention. They were afraid it would go down the news hole, so they tested the Jericho missile. The last time they tested it was four years ago, and the name Jericho wasn’t even mentioned, but this time there was a press release, and the test was done during the day out in the open. When Israel wants to hide things they know how to do it, and they wanted this report to build pressure on Iran and the US.

I’m convinced.

I’m leaving Sunday morning for the GA, so expect a lot of Tweeting and some blogging. Speakers include Aluf Benn, Peter Beinart and Martin Indyk. Netanyahu canceled, presumably because he wants to convince his cabinet to attack Iran. Cool. But I’m really excited to hear what Mr. Indyk, whom I featured in the last chapter of my thesis, has to say about all of this. So enjoy your weekend, wherever you are, and I’ll be updating from Denver!

Mark Landler of the New York Times’s Washington, D.C., bureau wrote an article (published today) titled, “As U.S. Steps Back, Europe Takes Bigger Role in Mideast Peace Push.” In it, he argues that “with talks at a standstill, the Obama administration now finds itself on the sidelines, and Europe is emerging as the key diplomatic actor.” Landler notes that neither Netanyahu nor Abbas have visited our nation’s capital since the spring, and explains that Europe’s “rising role” is the result of ” the peculiar dynamics of the Palestinian campaign at the United Nations. With more than 100 countries, most in the developing world, expected to support Palestinian recognition — and the United States almost certain to oppose it — Britain, France and Germany are viewed as influential swing votes.” The U.S., however, is “fatigued,” and as Martin Indyk is quoting as saying, “‘The action in the United Nations is a bigger problem for them than for us…It has the potential of splitting the E.U., with some siding with us and Israel and some siding with the Palestinians.’”

The problem with Landler’s analysis is that he has a few analysts saying that the E.U. matters, and that it’s this summer’s “prize,” but he presents no convincing evidence to back it up and even insists that a rift within the E.U. would be extremely problematic given its economic crisis. I understand that the E.U. has no problem splitting when it comes to political issues; take, for example, the cleavage caused by the question of whether or not to send troops to Iraq. With the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however, there is much more at stake. When and if there is an end or a solution to the conflict, it will change the Middle East because it will end the status quo. At present, there are also other distractions: France is deeply involved in Libya, Germany is trying to save the eurozone and Britain is dealing with its worst scandal in years.

Landler says that everyone is waiting for Europe to lay its cards on the table, but this an intangible fantasy. The members of the E.U., or rather its influential players, are not going to all of a sudden reveal where they stand on the Israel-Palestine issue. Even if they do, their answers will be unsatisfying, merely a throwback to the Oslo process, which it seems no one can go beyond. Catherine Ashton, the Union’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, does not seem to be particularly well-versed in the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The only bloc that has actually been firm about its approach to the United Nations vote on a Palestinian state in September is a group of states in South America that are vehemently pro-Palestinian.

The European Union will never be the solution to to the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate unless it creates a cohesive policy that strikes the right balance, which of course in and of itself has proved elusive. It seems that Israel is perfectly happy with the status quo, but the EU will not be a catalyst. The catalyst has to be either a mutually hurting stalemate or a mutually enticing opportunity.

And this is why Israel needs a legit body of laws instead of just the Basic Laws and an uncodified constitution:

According to the law, a person or an organization calling for a boycott of Israel, including the settlements, can be sued by the boycott’s targets without having to prove that they sustained damage. The court will then decide how much compensation would be paid. The second part of the law says a person or a company that declare a boycott of Israel or the settlements will not be able to bid in government tenders.

It was proposed that the vote on this law would not take place until after the Quartet meeting, which also happens today, but Netanyahu didn’t think it would make any difference.  Israel’s administrative legal experts took contradictory positions on the law:

Before the vote, the Knesset’s legal adviser, attorney Eyal Yanon, published a legal assessment saying parts of the law edge towards “illegality and perhaps beyond.” He went on to warn that the law “damages the core of freedom of expression in Israel.” Yanon’s assessment contradicts that of Attorney General Yehuda Weinstein, who said the bill is legal.

Besides that, I don’t know what else to say, except for that I don’t know how a majority of 47 Members of Knesset allowed this to happen.